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The modern civil law emerged from many centuries of development. In the 18th and 19th
centuries European civil law based on Roman law foundations carried forward the concept
of the individual citizen at the heart of the liberal revolutions. New conceptions of the role
of the state and the development of national civil codes re-orientated this conception. The
Soviet socialist legal model resonated faith in ‘top-down’ state control while at best tol-
erating a socialist version of the civil law. Today, internationally the philosophical char-
acteristics and legal rights of the individual citizen are explicated in public law and the
role of civil law is to provide the institutions, doctrines and transactions of civil society
and commercial law.
A distinguishing feature of the civil law is its enforceability horizontally in society
directly against those who fail in their responsibilities and does not depend on authority
acting ‘top-down’ within the public law realm. There are advantages to society and the
state in fostering direct horizontal enforcement. Without pro-active reform socialist and
formerly socialist legal systems have restricted capacity to gain these advantages. This is
not an argument against the importance of constitutionalism, human rights protection
and anti-corruption initiatives – the civil law provides an essential juristic background to
public regulation and a direct method of remediating loss occasioned by unlawful action.
& 2015 Mykolas Romeris University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All right
reserved. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In this paper functions of the civil law in society are explored. I will trace civil law jurisprudence across historical phases
that have tested it and at times displayed great animosity to it.
We will see that one aspect of the theory of civil law has proven highly advantageous in a modern legal system, both
socialist and western liberal legal systems. That is the capacity of civil law to institute accountability horizontally within the
legal system, allowing enforcement of its norms directly between private citizens, supplementing public law processes, in
consumer protection for example, at a time when regulation is critiqued and regulatory law enforcement budgets are
intensely scrutinised.uction and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All right reserved. This is an open access article under the CC BY-
/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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including social and governmental advantages, in two areas of law that emerged in the 20th century and are still taking
shape, competition law and environmental law, in order to identify the advantages of this approach.
We will also consider reforms required to harness this capacity of civil justice to achieve these broader social and
governmental beneﬁts, especially the importance for the civil law and its administration to achieve and maintain:
(i) principles that reﬂect modern ethical concerns, (ii) broad access to civil justice, and (iii) independent adjudication of civil
justice claims and enforcement of adjudication outcomes.2. When the civil law was the centre of law's universe
The modern civil law emerged from many centuries of legal development. In the 18th and 19th centuries, European civil
law based on Roman law foundations carried forward the concept of the individual citizen at the heart of the liberal
revolutions. This topic can only be reviewed here but was recently examined in depth (Raff & Taitslin, 2012, pp.158–164).
The great Renaissance and Enlightenment developments in European legal systems were stimulated by rediscovery of
classical Roman law (Dulckeit, Schwarz & Waldstein, 1989, 303–9) and focussed intently on the civil law (generally, Tigar &
Levy, 1977). However, while Roman law had distinguished between the ius privatum [private law] and the ius publicum
[public law], the law of medieval Europe did not draw a coherent distinction, a point well illustrated by the conﬂation of
sovereignty, lordship [seigneury] and ownership within feudal systems of land tenure. The Commentators, foremost Bartolus
(1314–57) and Baldus (1327–1400), essentially synthesised the Roman law with contemporary medieval conditions. The
Humanists of the 16th century, such as Donellus (1527–1591), argued that the nature of feudal law was alien to classical
Roman law, attempting to free the Roman notion of dominium as indivisible ownership from medieval customary feudal
divided ownership and the serfdom implicit in it (Stein, 1999, pp.78–82).The 17th century saw modern natural law theory
emerge as a revolutionary universal world view beyond the historical particularities of Roman law and was still shaping law
during the drafting of the German Civil Code (Raff, 2003, Chp. 3). The intellectual tradition of the exponents of natural law
was nevertheless deeply rooted in Roman law scholarship. The Classical natural law generally claimed religious justiﬁcation.
Modern natural law, by contrast is denoted by movement toward secular explanations of its principles, discovered through
reason in the nature of the universe and the nature of human existence within it (Weber, 1954, p. 288; Habermas, 1973).
For the towering ﬁgures of Enlightenment jurisprudence, Hugo Grotius (Grotius, 1926, 1925), Samuel Pufendorf
(Pufendorf, 1964) and Christian Wolff (Raff, 2003, 130; Winiger, 1992, p. 179), the civil law was the central concern of
modern natural law, although by the 18th century Wolff could already see that the state had responsibilities through its
bureaucracy for health, education and labour protection, in addition to external and internal security (Clark, 2007, p. 240).
Accordingly, the great codiﬁcations of the 18th and 19th centuries, the ﬁrst European code in the modern style, the Bavarian
Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus civilis of 1756, the Prussian Allgemeine Landrecht für die preußischen Staaten of 1794, the
French Code Civil of 1804, the Austrian Allgemeine bürgerliche Gesetzbuch für die deutschen Erblände of 1811 and even the
German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, enacted in 1896 but taking effect on 1 January 1900 (the ﬁrst day of the 20th century by
German reckoning), perpetuated a modern natural law conception of the individual within a civil law built largely around
Roman law as the legal description of the citizen within society. It is true that until the French Code Civil the codes were
drafted with faith in the ‘naturalness’ of the right of kings and the nobility to rule and to retain their estates, and the divine
right of monarchs and the natural rights of the aristocracy were still strong points of reference at the Congress of Vienna
(1814–1815) (Zamoyski, 2007), in contrast the French Code Civil sought to implement the natural rights of the individual
asserted in revolution – this distinction may be sheeted back to the social and historical positions of their authors. The Code
Civil was nevertheless entirely a Code of the civil or private law. The Code was however conceived in connection with the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen: for example, the deﬁnition of property in Art 544 of the Code followed the
conception in the Declaration, setting forth a liberal modern natural law unitary concept of ownership. However, the role of
the civil law in depicting the place of the individual in a broader natural law world view receded as the role of the public law
and foremost constitutions advanced, following the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, in expressing the rights of
individuals.3. The public law conception of the citizen in society
Even if the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen did not precipitate the demise of the civil law cosmology of
the individual, as claimed by Jellinek (Jellinek, 1901), we can see with hindsight that it foreshadowed a long-term trend that
continued with liberal declarations of civil rights in the United States constitutional Bill of Rights of 1791 and the Frankfurt
Constitution of 1849. The philosophical characteristics and the rights of the individual citizen were now to be explicated in
public law; speciﬁcally, constitutional statements of civil rights and human rights law. This movement connected to 19th
century development at the theoretical level as a new level of contemporary theorisation and critique emerged, reaching
beyond the traditional conception of the legal discipline and into the emergent ﬁelds of sociology and political economy,
contrasting the approaches of natural law thinkers, liberalism and the Historical School – Savigny, for example, acknowl-
edged the state but did not consider its structure and functions could be the stuff of legal science, only private law could be
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dimension.
Rudolf Ihering advanced a view of law as an institution with the social purpose of supporting the functioning of society
(Ihering, 1913, VIII. 2, p. 188). While Humboldt, Mill and their liberal contemporaries shared a modern natural law view that
the state and society could be built up from the standpoint of the individual, Ihering considered that we also exist for others
– society also has a claim upon us to further its purposes as it has helped to further our own (Ihering, 1913, VIII. 13, pp. 399–
401). Ihering also advocated the state's monopoly over the right to coerce, the authority to make the rules that regulate it,
the law (Ihering, 1913, VIII. 9, pp. 233–238), and the bi-laterally binding force of law in a state under the rule of law
[Rechtsstaat],1 implying subordination of the state authority itself to the laws it has issued (Ihering, 1913, VIII. 11, p. 267).
Ihering did not see the private law as a self-sufﬁcient domain (Ihering, 1913, VIII. 15, p. 420). In 19th century Germany the
notion of the state under rule of law developed in response to the need for stronger underpinning of the protection of civil
and private law rights. Robert von Mohl developed his contribution to the concept of the rule of law state in reaction against
the police state (Dietze, 1973, p. 20). Mohl presumed, at least in the early years, the existence of a self-deﬁned sphere for
private law and advocated for the Rechtsstaat as providing order in which people may live together (Von Mohl, 1841).
Jellinek contrasted two views of the relationship between the state and the individual in his work The Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of Citizens: A Contribution to Modern History (Jellinek, 1901) which was ﬁrst published in 1895: ﬁrst, that
the rights of the individual are the product of state concession and permission, which followed from the idea of state
omnipotence, and, secondly, that the state not only engenders the rights of the individual but also leaves to the individual
that measure of liberty that it does not itself require to limit in the interests of the whole. Individual liberty was thus
recognised merely as self-limitation by the state (Jellinek, 1922). In Allgemeine Staatslehre [General Theory of State], the ﬁrst
edition of which was published in 1900, Jellinek discerned a trend in the direction of socialisation and centralisation
[Verstaatlichung], in which the state was taking other spheres of individual human activity (Jellinek, 1922, p. 261). Jellinek
stated that all private rights are related to the public law claim for recognition and protection and when the whole of the
civil law is legislated into codes, private law itself is based in public law (Jellinek, 1922, p. 385). Jellinek is remembered today
for his recognition of civil rights as individual rights to freedom, such as freedom of conscience, expression and association,
as a sphere free of state intervention. However, this sphere of freedom emerges from his work almost as an afterthought in a
broader theory of an expanded if not exalted state. Recognition of the individual now depended on the existence of indi-
vidual public rights. Civil status was to be determined by recognition of an individual as a member of the state (Jellinek,
1922, pp. 419–421). The state was to remain under the rule of law as a state limited by its laws. The self-binding rule of law
state, advanced by Ihering and Jellinek, was intended to combat arbitrariness in the public law, not its dominance. Thus the
decline of the natural law vision and the signiﬁcance of the civil law were perpetuated. Redeﬁnition of the respective
provinces and roles of public law and civil law continued with the work of Duguit and contemporaries (Duguit, 1918, 1921,
1968; Raff & Taitslin, 2012, pp. 174–175).4. Emergence of a Soviet legal model and the abolition of the civil law
Although Marxist critique had contributed to the 1917 October Revolution, it provided no plan for a Marxist program of
reform – this fell to the revolutionaries (Raff & Taitslin, 2012, 2014). Would there be a legal system? What shape should a
socialist legal system take? The question of the direction to be taken with respect to the future of law would be torn
between two themes that emerged in competition from the works of Marx and Engels. In one direction was the vision of a
future socialist classless society with no state or law (Marx & Engels, 1975, p. 151), as the end point of social evolution and
thus the end of history, where socialist economic laws would sufﬁce. In the other direction, planning would be at the heart
of a socialist economy, implying a centralised economy. The contradiction was reconciled by the idea of a period of transition
toward a classless society where there would be no need for law and the state. In this period, the means of production would
become state property and industry would be centralised in the hand of the state (Engels, 1959, pp. 386–387; Engels, 1978,
Vol. 10, pp. 288–300). The second direction, the centralist view of the socialist state and its law as tools of socialisation,
followed the pro-state view considered progressive in Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, explored above.
Public Law approaches were portrayed as the way of the future and following progressive European theorists like Jellinek
(1922), Renner (1949) and Menger (Reich, 1972, pp. 50–66, pp. 73–75) the state was adulated as the portal to a new era of
human civilisation.
Immediately following the Russian revolution steps were taken to abolish market exchange, private property and pre-
revolutionary law. The civil law was targeted systematically for abolition in favour of central planning, top-down public law
systems and the economic laws of a socialist system. The Soviet Union virtually erased the civil law by the end of the era of
War Communism. The opportunity for citizens to challenge each other within society on a legal basis was replaced by
vertical claims and responsibilities in the public sphere. If the law in general was to fall away in the course of social
evolution to a higher plane, the civil law was to be systematically abolished with utmost urgency. The role of the civil law in1 The German constitutional concept of Rechtsstaat is translated in this paper as a ‘state under the rule of law’, or simply ‘rule of law state’. On Ihering's
concept of Rechtsstaat : see Ihering (1913), at VIII. 11, p. 289, pp. 290–1, p. 305, p. 315.
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higher theoretical place of the civil law as a horizontal system that required citizens to take responsibility for their private
actions toward each other, from the changeable content of its principles. Social law, as the antithesis of private law, embodied
the scientiﬁc progress of the era, bringing reform of family law and employment law, creating vertical responsibilities of the
socialist state to the individual and the individual to the socialist state as surrogate for a future broader communist society. The
orientation of the civil law to individual rights would no longer be appropriate in a collective society.
The New Economic Policy [NEP] (1921) was introduced to deal with urgent economic crisis. With it came an idea of
socialist civil law, manifested in the Civil Code of 1922 (RSFSR). It was justiﬁed as civil law for the transitional period, and the
question remained of when bourgeois civil law would wither away with the state and law in general, not if this would take
place. When the economic crisis had passed, the socialisation agenda continued with collectivisation under Stalin. The civil
law faded from relevance besides the rule of the Party and in view of the contraction of civil activity to which it would apply.
Although the Civil Code of 1922 remained on the law books, during the Stalin years it was of no practical relevance. However,
practical problems emerged in the horizontal relations of state enterprises, collectives and agencies, in response to which
Stuchka developed his two-sector theory of socialist law (Stuchka, 1988; Reich, 1972; Raff & Taitslin, 2012). The paradigm
emerging under central planning in the 1930s thus featured (i) socialist economic law, building on aspects of administrative
law that applied to relations between state enterprises, and (ii) narrowly deﬁned economic relations between citizens.
A new Soviet legal theory emerged in the late 1930s, coinciding with the Stalin Constitution of 1936, emphasising the
doctrine of the unity of state ownership and opening a new role for socialist civil law. The cause of developing a socialist civil
law was taken up by Stalin's Justice Minister, Vyshinskii, implicitly conceding the need for civil law even under top-down
central planning and state ownership of the means of production. The new conception of Soviet civil law led to the Soviet
Principles of Civil Legislation of 1961, which formed the basis of the Civil Code of the RSFSR of 1964 and were disseminated
widely in the socialist legal systems. The Soviet model of socialist civil law that emerged from this reform process was,
however, less diverse than models found in the legal systems of some other members of the socialist legal family (Zweigert
& Kötz, 1977, Vol. 1, pp. 300–317 – not repeated in later editions), such as the Civil Code of Poland of 1964 (Raff, 2010) and
that of the German Democratic Republic of 1975 (Raff & Taitslin, 2009). The civil law deﬁcit in the Soviet legal model
remains a challenge to countries that adopted it, in Asia and in Europe, in their efforts to liberalise their economies, or to
remodel socialist law, according to their national agendas (Raff & Taitslin, 2014).5. What we expect of civil law today – economic and juristic functions
The vital role of the civil law today is to provide the foundations for legal institutions, doctrines and transactions at the
basis of civil society and commercial law while balancing private rights with legal obligations and responsibilities.
Horizontal enforceability is a distinguishing feature of the civil law allowing direct action against those who fail in their civil
law obligations and responsibilities – it does not depend on a report being made to and acted upon ‘top-down’ by a public
authority within the public law realm. There are signiﬁcant advantages to the state and society generally in fostering direct
horizontal enforcement.
Academic commentators rarely articulate these points about the civil law, and they appear simply to be taken for granted
in the day-to-day operation of the legal system. I am not suggesting that there is an “either-or” policy choice to be made
between a civil law approach and public regulation. I am not arguing against the importance of constitutionalism or the
roles of human rights protection, anti-corruption and other agencies of the integrity branch of government, a term coined by
Ackerman (Ackerman, 2000, pp. 691–694; Burton & Williams, 2012). On the contrary, my point is that civil law provides a
juristic background to public regulation and a direct method of remediating loss occasioned by unlawful action. Civil law
remedies are relevant to the protection of human rights and penetration of corrupt practices, providing a web of disin-
centives to unlawful action and adding depth to public regulation. These points are illustrated clearly in discussion of the
advantages of direct horizontal law enforcement in two areas of law that emerged in the latter half of the 20th century: they
are the private enforcement of competition law and environmental law.
5.1. Private enforcement of competition law
Buxbaum (2007) has outlined the objectives of the private enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Law (Sherman Act, 1890 and
Clayton Act, 1914). Provision for private enforcement has remained essentially the same since it was moved with some
further reforms to the Clayton Act in 1914. The reforms included allowing a civil plaintiff to rely on the factual ﬁndings made
in prior civil or criminal action undertaken by the government, known as “follow-on actions” (15 U.S.C. § 16(a)) and
introduction of equitable rights of action for private claimants. Australian trade practices law has also embraced private
enforcement (Brunt, 1990). Buxbaum raised this issue in the course of discussing the 2005 Green Paper of the European
Commission on the enforcement of the European Union anti-trust rules (European Community, 2005a, 2005b). The
objectives of private enforcement identiﬁed by Buxbaum (2007, pp. 43–44) are:
i. allowing private parties injured by antitrust violations to claim compensation directly from the wrongdoer.
ii. depriving wrongdoers of the beneﬁts of their unlawful conduct.
M. Raff / International Comparative Jurisprudence 1 (2015) 24–3228iii. deterring future violations.
iv. punishing wrongdoers – 15 USC § 15 (a) provides for recovery of threefold damages by civil litigants.
v. a role for private claims in harnessing the “self-policing capacity of business”, thus assigning private actions a public
enforcement role as well, and preserving public resources for the prosecution of the most serious violations when
government might not have the resources necessary to uncover, investigate, and prosecute all violations of the law.2
vi. ensuring some level of enforcement in cases where public regulators might not otherwise act, because of lack of
independence or lack of resources (Buxbaum, 2007, p. 50).
In respect of points (iii) deterring future violations and (iv) punishing wrongdoers, these objectives are not con-
ventionally attributed to the civil law and may be explained by the semi-regulatory nature of antitrust law. However,
substituting the concept of disincentive for that of deterrence, we can see relevance in these points for the civil law as well,
particularly when the disincentive follows from using legal liability as a tool for forcing the internalisation of external costs
imposed on society or the environment: a point illustrated in the next section.
5.2. Private enforcement of environmental law
Civil liability for environmental harm illustrates the potential advantages of horizontal legal liability to force inter-
nalisation of the broader costs of civil misbehaviour in the cost of production. In turn, civil and commercial actors who do
comply with the law are better able to succeed in competition with those who do not fulﬁl their legal responsibilities by
forcing them to accept liability for the consequences. The rule of law is thus achieved more broadly at lower social cost. This
approach reverses the “race to the bottom” that naked market forces set in train. One classical illustration of the “race to the
bottom” is provided by a new industry negotiating lower environmental standards in exchange for locating in the relevant
jurisdiction, rather than a neighbouring state, which might in turn offer yet lower standards in order to attract the new
industry.
Market approaches to environmental challenges have limitations for a range of reasons. Markets have limited usefulness
in gauging the worth of disutility, that cannot be monetised (Calabresi & Melamed, 1972, 1094 n. 11; Raff, 1999). Markets are
multi-lateral relationships between human beings for the exchange of wealth and goods, assets and services. They are thus
inherently anthropocentric. Effective environmental law and ethics, on the other hand, require solutions that are effective
from the point of view of all organisms in an ecosystem. On this point participants in a market can never have perfect or
even certain knowledge (Calabresi & Melamed, 1972, p. 1095), so for this reason too market forces alone cannot ensure the
health of ecosystems. Economic instruments reﬂect human economic relationships and cannot be expected alone to sufﬁce.
The use of economic instruments in a market situation must thus be very sophisticated and supported by other regulatory
measures. Especially important are measures that support information gathering and publication, such as reliable eco-
labelling of products and the environmental impact assessment of projects, so that other human actors in the market can
make effective choices, and so that potential market failure can be detected at an early stage.
The need for civil law standards of environmental quality, backed by public law environmental protection legislation, is
thus fundamental.
Particular problems are found with respect to the need for all actors in a market to internalise their environmental costs.
The total value of an environment is not easily commoditised. If it can be done at all, the cost of remediation of a degraded
environment is difﬁcult to foresee and is far in excess of the cost of preventing the degradation in the ﬁrst place. Scientists
estimate that a degraded environment can be remediated by humans to only a fraction of the diversity of the undamaged
environment. The use of legal liability alone as a disincentive to environmental abuse in a market situation is therefore
attended by problems. These include:
 the polluter might not recognise the existence or extent of the potential problem,
 the polluter might not have the resources to pay for remediation and simply disappear into insolvency, and
 the environmental value might never be regained in any case.
In this situation of a very imperfect market, in which most of the costs cannot even be monetised, the law must operate
to induce the party who can most cheaply avoid the social and environmental costs, the prospective polluter, to do this, in
addition to advancing collective solutions (Calabresi & Melamed, 1972, p. 1097). Not surprisingly, this is the internationally
accepted position. Principle 16 of the U.N.C.E.D. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development provides –2 In
necessa
publicNational authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic
instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due
regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and investment.this connection, Buxbaum relates (Buxbaum, 2007, 43 n. 9 and 44) that the U.S. Congress was aware the U.S. government would not have the
ry resources to uncover, investigate, and prosecute all violations of the anti-trust laws and, indeed, no budgetary appropriations had been made for
enforcement at the time when the Sherman Act was enacted.
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The rights of nature, outside human conceptions of imperfect markets, have been recognised internationally since before the
U.N. World Charter for Nature:Convinced that: (a) Every form of life is unique, warranting respect regardless of its worth to man, and, to accord other
organisms such recognition, man must be guided by a moral code of action,...These approaches thus signal (i) a public law dimension in which private citizens may enforce environment protection
legislation directly against each other, and (ii) facilitating private action in the civil law to restrain behaviour that places at-
risk environmental, property and personal security and to recover remediation and compensation directly when damage
has been caused. Naturally public environmental protection authorities must continue to be resourced to enforce the leg-
islation in the interests of the public and of the environment. However, breach of environmental protection legislation
should be a ground of private claim for an injunction or civil monetary damages, as well as a ground of criminal prosecution.
The German Civil Code provides in § 906 for example that the occurrence of a nuisance will be taken to be established for
civil law purposes if a breach of the Federal Pollution Statute can be shown.
The objective is to use potential and actual legal liability to compel internalisation of environmental externalities from the
view of human environmental interests as well as natural organisms in ecosystems that do not have the ability to initiate
prosecution or commence litigation.
One reason frequently offered for not broadening access to civil law remedies is that control must be maintained over
who is to be subject to legal liability. This objection fuels perceptions of cronyism – that government departments, mates of
the government and pet projects get an easy time under environmental and planning law through the exercise of
administrative discretions. If these perceptions were well founded, it would plainly be at odds with the principle of rule of
law. This situation would undermine conﬁdence in the public administration and raise the objection that selective enfor-
cement is anti-competitive. It would certainly be anti-competitive with respect to operators who do not enjoy “special
status”.
If one manufacturer is operating within environmental law, and thus has internalised environmental costs, it, before
anyone else, must be entitled to take on competitors who are taking a free ride by breaking the law with respect to the
environment. This is self-evident. Analogous examples include rights to restrain misuse of trademarks and business names,
and other designations, and thus prevent shoddy operators taking a free ride on established commercial goodwill. In
Australia, there is no restriction on who may take action against such “misleading or deceptive conduct” in the course of
trade and commerce, prohibited by s. 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth.). Community and private sector legal action
can make law enforcement more cost-effective for the government. The scenario of private actors seeking to surpass each
other in environmental protection is, of course, a pleasing one.6. Reforming civil justice to achieve social and governmental beneﬁts
To achieve these broader social and governmental beneﬁts, it is important for civil justice administration to achieve and
maintain:
 principles that reﬂect current ethical concerns,
 broad access to civil justice, and
 independent adjudication of civil justice claims and enforcement of adjudication outcomes.
These are explored below.
6.1. Principles that reﬂect current ethical concerns
When it does not reﬂect contemporary ethical concerns, the civil law risks social disrepute, as we saw above with respect
to the Russian revolution. This is an on-going problem in common law systems because of the slow pace at which the
common law revises its principles in light of social expectations. It is particularly evident with respect to principles of tort
concerning environmental damage. The relevant common law principles were formulated during the Industrial Revolution
with the protection of property rights in mind: leaning more toward protection of the right to emit pollution from property
rather than preserving clean environments on one's own property, let alone the interests of other organisms in the
environment. Recognition of the right to a healthy environment and the need for integrity of ecosystems has thus led to the
development of environmental protection legislation to ﬁll the gap. This has been recognised by the courts. In Cambridge
Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather Plc. The English House of Lords concluded that innocent neighbours must bear loss
which polluters could not reasonably foresee at the time when they released their damaging materials, even if other
damage, such as serious injury to personnel working in the polluting factory, could reasonably have been foreseen (Lord Goff
of Chieveley, House of Lords, at (1994) 2 A.C. 264, 292). Groundwater extracted by the plaintiff water utility was unﬁt for
human consumption due to spillage of organochlorines at the defendant's factory, located some two kilometres away. In the
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more advanced environmental protection norms:The protection and preservation of the environment is now perceived as being of crucial importance to the future of
mankind; and public bodies, both national and international, are taking signiﬁcant steps towards the establishment of
legislation which will promote the protection of the environment . . . But it does not follow from these developments
that a common law principle, such as the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, should be developed or rendered more strict to
provide for liability in respect of such pollution. On the contrary, given that so much well-informed and carefully
structured legislation is now being put in place for this purpose, there is less need for the courts to develop a common
law principle to achieve the same end, and indeed it may well be undesirable that they should do so (Lord Goff of
Chieveley, House of Lords, at (1994) 2 A.C. 264, 305).The result is that common law fashioned largely in the course of the 19th century industrial revolution continues to
favour the industrial landowner until environmental protection legislation can be put in place. However, in turn the
common law courts interpret reforming environmental protection legislation so far as possible to preserve the common law
private rights of the landowner it seeks to regulate. The case of Protean (Holdings) Ltd. V. Environment Protection Authority
provides an example of reforming environmental protection legislation being deliberately interpreted by a court in a way
that minimised regulatory impact on the holder of private proprietary rights (Supreme Court of Victoria [1977] V.R. 51; Raff,
2003, p. 2).
Codiﬁed systems appear better positioned to adapt. I have referred above to the connection made between civil law
liability for environmental pollution in § 906 of the German Civil Code and anti-pollution standards set out in environmental
protection legislation. The German Environmental Liability Statute established in § 6 strict liability for environmental
damage, with a legal presumption that a site capable of creating the damage that actually occurred has created the damage,
and there is no restriction on private parties litigating directly to recover compensation on the basis of this liability. Another
example of the civil law reﬂecting contemporary ethical concerns is provided by the 1990 animal rights amendment of the
German Civil Code, which introduced § 90a providing:Animals are not things. They are protected through particular legislation. To them, the provisions in force for things
are to be applied correspondingly, so far as nothing is otherwise speciﬁed.This provision is supplemented by a new sentence added to the main deﬁnition of “ownership” in § 903:Powers of the Owner The owner of a thing can, so far as not contrary to law or the rights of third parties, deal with the
thing at discretion and exclude others from every use or misuse of it. The owner of an animal has to observe the
particular provisions for the protection of animals in the exercise of his powers.Although this amendment is often criticised as weak and tokenistic within Germany, it is impossible to imagine common
law systems, by reﬁnement of common law principle in the course of superior courts deciding cases, removing animals from
the basic civil conception of an object of property and importing into the civil law a requirement that animal welfare
standards must be observed when the owner exercises his or her discretions with respect to the property. The primary
example that I have drawn above in support of horizontal effects, the private enforcement of competition law, is of course
drawn from a common law system but the relevant cause of action is found in legislation.
Where the civil law fails to reﬂect current ethical concerns its capacity to support appropriate horizontal law enforce-
ment through private litigation is undermined.
6.2. Broad access to civil justice
One signiﬁcant obstacle is the question of legal costs. Clearly, if legal costs are beyond the reach of the general popu-
lation, horizontal enforcement of basic legal norms through the courts becomes the preserve of the commercial world and
the wealthy. In this respect as well, codiﬁed systems appear to have an advantage. Further research on this point is clearly
needed, however in an informal gathering at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in
Hamburg in 2011 foreign researchers working in the Institute were asked with respect to a speciﬁc scenario conceived in the
law of succession to estimate the lowest claim they would consider justiﬁed in litigating as a private party in the state
supreme courts of their countries, taking into account usual risks and assuming three parties to the litigation. All of the
researchers from Common Law systems reported limits that were considerably higher than all of the Civil Law systems.
There was a dramatic difference between Victoria, Australia, at US$ 8 million and Germany at US$30,000. As noted, this
should be explored in a properly structured study, in which the sources of expense could be identiﬁed, such as civil pro-
cedure, legal indeterminacy, legal professional costs of a divided legal profession (solicitors and barristers) and court
inefﬁciencies. There is an enormous challenge in determining valid measures for the comparison, and one must admire
scholarly attempts to do so (Henssler, 2014).
In the United States potential costs in civil litigation are balanced to some extent by the availability of representative and
class actions and contingency fees, where legal costs are paid to one's lawyer only if one is successful.
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For the civil law to provide the foundation for horizontal enforcement, private litigants must be conﬁdent about the
independence and objectivity of the judges deciding their cases. Processes for the enforcement of court judgments must also
be independent and objective.7. Conclusion
In this paper, I have reviewed the history and philosophy of civil law to identify its persistent themes and its potential
roles in the 21st century. Modern natural law of the post-Enlightenment period embodied philosophical ideas of the place of
the individual citizen in human society and the universe more broadly which were taken up in theories of the civil law and
civil law codiﬁcation; a role that today we see in constitutional and human rights law.
In the 19th century, progressive theorists expressed conﬁdence in the modern state as a force with the capacity to usher
in a new era of human civilisation regulated by public law. The Bolshevik revolutionaries followed this direction, doubtless
to an extreme extent, and, with views of the civil law as objectionable individualistic bourgeois law, sought to abolish the
civil law in favour of ‘top-down’ enforcement processes. However, even within the planned economy under socialism it was
found that the system lacked horizontal accountability between state-owned enterprises, collectives and agencies, leading
to the development of socialist civil law. Following this revival the socialist legal systems nevertheless remained subject to a
deﬁcit with respect to institutions, doctrines and principles of civil law. The need to rectify this deﬁcit should be noted when
setting priorities for the reform of socialist legal systems.
With liberalisation of economies and down-sizing of government emerging as a worldwide trend in the 1980s and 1990s
it has been recognised that a persistent feature of the civil law, the horizontal enforcement of its norms directly between
private parties, brings great advantages. It can supplement public law processes, at a time of scepticism about regulatory
approaches and intense scrutiny of law enforcement budgets. This feature of the civil law is largely taken for granted and
rarely the speciﬁc subject of commentary. However, in at least two relatively new areas of law considerable commentary has
been directed to identifying the advantages, including broader social and governmental advantages that follow from private
law enforcement: those areas are competition law and environmental law. We saw (Buxbaum, 2007) that those advantages
were:
 private parties may claim compensation for damages and injury directly from the wrongdoer,
 wrongdoers are deprived of the beneﬁts of their unlawful conduct,
 disincentives to future violations are set up and through the internalisation of costs, formerly externalised to other parties
or the environment, private actors who are working within legal standards can compete more equally,
 the “self-policing capacity of business” is harnessed, thus assigning private actions a public enforcement role as well, and
preserving public resources for the prosecution of the most serious violations,
 preserving some level of enforcement even in cases where public regulators might not otherwise act; for example,
because of low policy priorities or lack of independence, distance from the dispute or resources.
We also noted that in order to harness this capacity of civil justice to achieve these broader social and governmental
beneﬁts, it is important for the civil law and its administration to maintain (i) legal principles that reﬂect modern ethical
concerns, (ii) broad access to civil justice, and (iii) judicial independence in the adjudication of civil justice claims and the
enforcement of adjudication outcomes.
In this way, reform of civil law institutions and principles contributes to the achievement of rule of law. The priority and
resourcing accorded to reform of the civil law in socialist and formerly socialist legal systems needs to be re-assessed in view
of the historical and systemic deﬁcits experienced in this respect by these systems.References
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